Distribution of Economic Well-Being by Ronald L. Oaxaca
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Distribution of Economic Well-Being





Chapter Title: The Persistence of Male-Female Earnings Differentials
Chapter Author: Ronald L. Oaxaca
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4375
Chapter pages in book: (p. 303 - 354)8
RONALD L.The Persistence of
Male-Female Earnings
Differentials
Withthe passage of the 1963 Federal Equal Pay Act and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, it was hoped that the earnings differentials between the races
and the sexes would be substantially reduced. In the case of the
male-female earnings differential, it is clear that the high expectations of
the federal legislation have yet to be realized. It has been ten years since
the passage of the Civil Rights Act; yet the earnings gap between the
sexes remains sizable.
This paper examines some of the factors responsible for the continued
existence of sizable earnings differentials between the sexes. In and of
itself, the existence of an earnings differential is not necessarily indicative
of the extent of labor market discrimination. The crucial question is:
What proportion of the observed differential is attributable to discrimina-
tion and what proportion is justifiable on some generally accepted
grounds of equity. Looked at in this way, it is clear that the success or
failure of legislation in reducing discrimination cannot be measured by
changes in the gross earnings differential alone. Therefore, our analysis
will focus on estimated changes in the proportion of the gross male-
female earnings differential that result from discriminatory practices in
the labor market.
NOTE:This research was supported in part by a grant from the Research Council of the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments by Ronald G.
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-jThe outline of the paper is as follows: the underlying analytical model is
developed in Section I; the empirical results are presented and discussed
in Section II; Section III is a summary and conclusion; and the appendix
contains supplementary regressions.
I.ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Economics of Discrimination
Inthe Becker model of discrimination, economic agents assert their
propensities to discriminate against a given group of workers by acting as
if the net cost of dealing with the group is greater than the direct money
cost involved [Becker 1971]. For example, employers apply a psychic
markup to the nominal wage that would be given to workers whom they
have a distaste for hiring. Similarly, consumers apply a psychic markup to
the price of a product or service which is produced or sold by workers
whom they would prefer to avoid dealing with. In the case of workers,
some may psychologically discount the wage they would receive from
working with members of a group whom they would prefer to avoid. The
extent of an economic agent's propensity to discriminate is measured by
the percentage markup or discount applied to members of certain
demographic groups. This percentage markup or discount is called the
discrimination coefficient, and it measures the psychic costs incurred in
dealing with workers from these groups.
Unless men and women are virtually identical with respect to the
determinants of earnings, the magnitude of the gross earnings differential
tells us little about the extent of discrimination in the labor market. This is
because sex differences in the characteristics which determine earnings
would generate sex differences in earnings even in the absence of
discriminatory employment practices. Of course, such differences in the
determinants of earnings reflect societal discrimination in terms of social
conditioning from cradle to grave and unequal access to educational and
vocational opportunities. In this sense, any difference in earnings would
reflect discrimination in a larger context; however, we are interested here
in discrimination that stems from the labor market. Thus, personal C
characteristicsare taken as given. The overall effects of labor market
discrimination can be measured by the market discrimination coefficient
(D),whichis defined to be the proportionate difference between the
actual male/female earnings ratio and the ratio in the absence of
discrimination. In terms of natural logarithms
(1)
Oaxacawhere Y,,, and Y1 are the observed full-time earnings of men and women,
respectively, andand Y,9are theirrespective full-time earnings in the
absence of discrimination. According to Becker, the market discrimina-
tion coefficient will depend on such factors as the degree of substitutabil-
ity between male and female workers, market structure, returns to scale,
the relative supply of female workers, the average discrimination coeffi-
cient, and the dispersion in individual discrimination coefficients.
Suppose the production function can be characterized as Z = FfL,K]
and L = amLm + afLfwhereZ represents output, L represents the labor
input, K is vector of other inputs, and am and a1 are the efficiency
parameters of male (Lm) and female (L1) labor, respectively. The margi-
nal products of men and women are denoted by MPmandMP1, respec-
tively. Thus,
am/a,
Inthe absence of discrimination, cost minimization brings about
Y? am/a,
butin a discriminating labor market, net cost minimization implies
(2) Ym/Y,=(D+1)(am/a,)
Let the observed gross male-female earnings differential (G) be defined
by
(3) G+1=Ym/Yí
Now substituting (3) in (2) and taking logs of both sides we have
(4) lfl(G+1)lfl(D+1)+lfl(am/ap)
which is merely a rearrangement of equation 1. According to equation 4,
the gross differential (in logs) can be separated into the effects of
discrimination and the effects of male/female productivity differences. In
the special case of perfect substitutes (am= a1),any observed differences
in earnings would be totally the result of labor market discrimination.
Cross-SectionModel
Themethodology employed in this section is derived from the author's
previous study of male-female wage differentials [Oaxaca 1973]. The
purpose of a cross-section analysis is to estimate the market discrimina-
tion coefficient at a point in time. Estimates of the effects of discrimina-
tion can be made for two cross sections, 1960 and 1970, and then
compared.
ThePersistence of Male-Female Earnings Differentials 305We wish to specify and estimate a functional relationship between
earnings and various socioeconomic variables: Y = f(Xi,. .., where
V represents earnings, and the X's represent socioeconomic determin-
ants of earnings. A commonly accepted functional form for the earnings
relationship is that of the semilog specification which can be justified on
the basis of human capital theory [Becker 1966]. Thus,
where 13,.isthe percentage effect on earnings from a change in Xk,other
things held constant. Given a cross section of male and female workers,
we can specify the corresponding statistical models as
(5) j1,.. .,Nm
(6) in (Y,,) = + /2,16j= 1,., N1
where m and findexmen and women, respectively; Nm andare the
number of men and women, respectively; jindexesthe jth worker in each
group; k indexes the kth variable; and andare the error terms.
We shall assume that in a nondiscriminatory labor market, the
parameters in (5) and (6) would be identical for men and women, i.e., in
the absence of discrimination, men and women would face a common
(7 earnings structure. Accordingly, differences between the sexes in per-
sonal characteristics provide the basis for a justifiable earnings differen-
tial; whereas male-female differences in the parameters provide the basis
(8 for measuring the degree of labor market discrimination. Since we have
no way of knowing what the common earnings structure would be in the
(9
absence of discrimination, we are forced to make some assumption about
this. We shall assume that the male earnings structure given by (5) would
be the common earnings relationship that would apply to both men and
women in the absence of discrimination. If sex discrimination against
women exists, this assumption asserts that the currently observed average
earnings of men is exactly what we should observe in the absence of
discrimination, but the observed average earnings of women is below (10)
what they would receive in a nondiscriminating labor market. We could
have assumed, instead, that the female earnings relationship given by (6)
is the common earnings structure that would apply in the absence of
discrimination. This assumption implies that the currently observed
average earnings of women would be equal to their average earnings in (11
the absence of discrimination; however, in this instance, discrimination
against women would manifest itself as a situation in which men received,




Our assumption that the male earnings relationships would be the
prevailing earnings structure in the absence of discrimination is not an
entirely arbitrary assumption. The intents of the 1963 Federal Equal Pay
Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act were not to correct earnings disparities
by lowering the earnings of white or male workers, but rather to bring
about compliance with the goal of equal employment opportunity by
increasing the earnings of affected minority and female workers. Conse-
quently, the achievement of equal employment opportunity would most
likely produce a common earnings structure more closely resembling the
current male earnings relationship.
By a well-known property of ordinary-least-squares regression we
have the following relationships:
k
whereYm andY1 are the geometric mean earnings of men and women,
respectively; X,,,kandXfkarethe average values of the kth variable for
men and women, respectively; and f3mk and f3fk are the corresponding
estimated coefficients. The gross earnings differential is calculated as
(7)
Under our assumption about the common earnings relationship, we have
(8)
(9)
where and arethe respective estimated earnings of men and
women in the absence of discrimination. If we substitute equations 7, 8,
and 9 into the formula for the market discrimination coefficient given by
(1), it can be shown that
(10) In 1)=ln
where = I3mk and i5=the estimated market discrimination
coefficient. The relative productivity of men is estimated from equations
8 and 9 as
(11) In = In (22,/a)=
where
= Xmk—
The Persistence of Male-Female Earnings Differentials 307The decomposition of the gross earnings differential into the effects of
discrimination and the effects of productivity differences is accomplished
through the substitution of equations 10 and 11 into equation 4:
In (G + 1) =in(15 + 1)+ln
Ic k
Thestatistical significance of male-female differences in the estimated
coefficients can be directly estimated by combining equations 5 and 6 into
a single pooled regression in which the male observations are identified
(1
by a sex dummy variable:
J=l,...,Ni+Nm
where M, =1if the worker is male and =0 otherwise. (1:
The test for the overall structural difference between the male and
female earnings relationships given by (5) and (6), respectively, is equi-
valent to a joint test of significance corresponding to the 'S.'
Annual rates of change in gross earnings differentials, discrim-
ination, and relative productivity can be estimated from appropriate
comparisons between 1960 and 1970 Census cross-section results. Let
in (G + 1) =ln(G + 1)70 —in(G + 1)60 and similarly forln (D+1) and
in Y,°).2 We then have
g= a In(G+ 1)/ar=in (G + 1)/10
(1
m —f=t9 in =In
so that g =d+ m —f: where g =theannual percentage rate of change in
the male/female earnings ratio; d =theannual percentage rate of change
in the male/female earnings ratio attributable to changes in discrimina-
tion;and m—fthe annual percentagerateof change inthe
male/female earnings ratio attributable to change in relative productivity
or labor quality (m and! =therates of growth of male and female labor
quality, respectively).
Time-SeriesModel
Bycomparing cross-section results from widely spaced periods in time,
we hope to be able to make some judgment about trends in discrimination
and relative productivity. The inferences drawn about trends derived
from comparisons between two Census years implicitly assume either
that cyclical conditions were the same in the two periods or that changes (1
in discrimination are unaffected by the business cycle. This is an
308 Oaxacaimportant consideration because what is believed to be a trend may in
reality be a transitory phenomenon reflecting different cyclical conditions
in the periods covered by the Census data. Consequently, a time-series
approach will be pursued in a manner similar to that followed by Orley
Ashenfelter in his study of changes in racial discrimination over time
[Ashenfelter 19701.
The time-series analog of equation 2 is given by
(12) Ym(t)/ Y1(t) = [D(t) +11[am(t)/a,(t)I
Suppose that the market discrimination coefficient has constant, trend,
and cyclical components. One specification could be
(13) D(t)+1 =exp[C0+dt+a1V(t)]
where d is the percentage change in the male/female earnings ratio
attributable to changes in discrimination; and V(t) is a cyclical aggregate
demand variable. In periods of tight labor markets, the cost of employ-
ment discrimination rises due to a general shortage of labor. Also, any
worker resistance to equal employment opportunities for women may
become less acute in periods of relative prosperity. A reasonable cyclical
indicator is given by the unemployment rate of white males 35—44.
Accordingly, we would expect ai >0.Allowing for exponential growth in
marginal productivities, we have
(14) am(t)/af(t) = exp (mt)J/[a01 exp (ft)]
wherem and farethe growth rates of male and female labor produc-
tivities, respectively. Ideally, it would be preferable to use wage rates
rather than earnings in examining discrimination in rates of pay; how-
ever, time-series wage data are not disaggregated according to sex. The
use of earnings data for year-round full-time workers is an effort to
circumvent the lack of wage-rate data. Unfortunately, there still remains
the problem that even among year-round full-time workers, men and
women do not typically work the same number of hours. It has been
estimated that men in this category may work as many as 10 percent more
hours during a year than women [Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
1973]. As an attempt to capture variations in relative hours worked, we
introduce the ratio of the female unemployment rate, 14(t),tothe male
unemployment rate, Um(t), as a proxy for the relative use of female labor.
If we now substitute equations 13 and 14 into 12, take logs of both sides,
and add the labor utilization term and a disturbance term, we arrive at the
operational representation of equation 4:
(15) In{G(t) +1] =C+gt +a1V(t) +a2{Uf(r)/U,,,(t)]
whereg = d +m—f.
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JGiven our estimate of the adjusted growth rate of the male/female
earnings ratio (g), we could estimate the percentage change attributable
to discrimination if we had some independent estimate of the growth rate
in the relative labor quality of males (m —f).FollowingAshenfelter, we
define the following index of labor quality:
j=m,f
where Q1(t) is the labor quality index;is the proportion of workers in
the jth sex group with s years of schooling; andis the earnings
attributable to s years of schooling in some base period. Although the
labor quality index for men should be constructed. using male earnings,
the choice of earnings figures for women is not so obvious. If we believe
that male-female earnings differences within given schooling categories
are solely the result of discrimination, it would be proper to use the male
earnings figures to construct the female labor quality index. On the other
hand, if we believe that sex differences in earnings within given schooling
categories are solely the result of lower quality schooling for women, then
it would be proper to use the earnings figures for women in the
construction of their labor quality index. One could argue that women
specialize in subject matters that raise their productivity in the home
rather than in the market sector. Even here, a question arises as to what
extent such specialization is a response to anticipated discrimination in





Assuming that the labor quality indexes grow exponentially, we can posit
the following time-series relationship:
In [Qm (t)/Qf(t)]= C0 + (m/)t+(t)
Givengand(th —f),itis then possible to obtain d.
Accordingto Becker, the market discrimination coefficient can be
expected to increase with increases in the relative supply of female
workers, the average propensity to discriminate, and the variance of
individual discrimination coefficients. Thus, for example, an increase in
the female proportion of the labor force would widen the male-female
earnings differential, even though there were no changes in the propen-
sity to discriminate. This could occur because the increased proportion of
310 OaxacaF
women must partly be absorbed by firms with discrimination coefficients
above the former equilibrium market discrimination coefficient. Conse-
quently, women would have to accept a lower relative wage which then
raises the equilibrium market discrimination coefficient. Since the non-
white proportion of the labor force has been fairly constant, Ashenfelter
was able to ignore the relative supply factor in his analysis of race earnings
differentials [Ashenfelter 1970]. Furthermore, the assumption of a
nonshifting, perfectly inelastic nonwhite relative supply curve allowed
him to interpret equation 15 as a relative demand curve. Thus, changes in
the race earnings differential could be attributed solely to changes in
relative demand. Unfortunately, this assumption is not tenable in the case
of sex discrimination because the relative supply of females has been
rising steadily. Therefore, equation 15 is interpreted as a reduced-form
equation. In a structural relative demand equation, we would expect a
positive relationship between the male-female earnings differential and
the relative supply of women. This implies that our estimate of the change
in the earnings differential, attributable to discrimination, ci,measures
the combined effects of changes in relative female labor supply and
changes in the expected value and variance of individual discrimination
coefficients.
The most important source of the overall earnings differential between
the sexes is probably their differing occupational distributions, as
opposed to unequal pay for equal work. It is currently a matter of debate
whether and to what extent the different occupational distributions are
the results of labor market discrimination and to what extent duff erent job
preferences are responsible. Promising research is being conducted by
psychologists studying whether there really are sex and race differences in
motivation, aspirations, and expectations about career fulfillment [Gurin
1974] and [Laws 1974]. Such research provides the psychological and
sociological backdrops for different occupational attachments and labor-
supply elasticities. For the present, we confine ourselves to trends in
occupational distributions and short-run cyclical determinants of occupa-
tional distributions. The time-series relationship is specified as
=b011+b111e+b211V(t)+1111(t)
wherei denotes the ith occupational category, jdenotesmale or female,
is the percent of the jth group's labor force who are in the ith
occupation, t is the time-trend variable, V(t) is the cyclical demand
variable (the unemployment rate of white males aged 35—44), and is
the disturbance term. The changes in male-female differences in occupa-
tional distribution can be directly estimated by
ThePersistence of Male-Female Earnings Differentials 311where
= Oim(t) —011(t),àb11 = b11,,, —b111,and = b2ìmb211.
C
Itis clear that the effects of changes in occupational distributions on the
male-female earnings differential depend on male-female earnings
differentials within occupations. To see this explicitly, let us consider the
following identity:
(16)
where all earnings are geometric means, and 0,,,, and 0,' are the
proportions of the male and all female labor forces in occupation i,
respectively. Next, letin (G,+ 1) = in (Y,,,) —in where G is
the male-female earnings differential in the ith occupation. Now
substituteforin (Y,r)in(16)theexpressiongivenby
in (11,') = in (Y,m)— In(G1 + 1). After collecting terms we have
(17)
Differentiating both sides of (17) with respect to time yields
(18) + +ln(G +1)biti+g1Oit]
Thus, the contribution of each occupation to changes in the overall
male/female earnings ratio can be estimated from equation 18.
Overall occupational dissimilarity between the sexes can be measured
by means of an index used by the Council of Economic Advisers in their
recent report on the economic role of women [CEA 1973]. For purposes
of examining continuous movements in occupational dissimilarity, we
compute the value of the index for each year as
1(t)
where 1(t) is the index of occupational dissimilarity and isthe
absolute value of the difference between the percentage of men in the ith
occupation at time tandthe percentage of women in occupation i at time
t.Ifmen and women were equally concentrated across all occupations,
the index would equal zero. On the other hand, if each occupation were
either all male or all female, the value of the index would equal one
hundred. Intermediate values of the index indicate varying degrees of
occupational dissimilarity. In order to detect trend and cyclical changes in
occupational dissimilarity between the sexes, regressions of the following
type are estimated: 1(t) = bo + b1t+ b2V(t) +
312 OaxacaII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Cross Section
Thedata for the cross-section analysis are urban worker subsamples
drawn from the 1/1000 Public Use Samples of the 1960 and 1970
censuses. Of the variety of 1/1000 samples available from the 1970
Census, the 15 percent Neighborhood Characteristics sample was used in
this study. Our analysis is confined to those who worked 50—52 weeks in
the year preceding the Census year, who resided inside urban areas, and
who were either government or private wage and salary workers. The
gross differential in (geometric) mean earnings for whites rose from 79
percent in 1959 to 84 percent in 1969, while for blacks it declined from 95
percent to 60 percent over the same period.2
The earnings regressions corresponding to equations 5and6 are
reported in Tables A-i and A-2 in the appendix. We are more directly
concerned with the resulting (log) decomposition of the sex earnings
differentials into the effects of sex differences in the estimated coefficients
and sex differences in the mean values of the independent variables. The
former provides the basis for estimating the discrimination coefficient and
the latter yields an estimate of labor quality or productivity differentials.
These decompositions are reported in sum and also separately by
independent variable in Tables 1 and 2. For each year there are two sets
of decompositions: one set is based on earnings regressions which control
for government employment, occupation, and industry, whereas the
other set is based on earnings regressions which omit these variables. By
not controlling for these variables, we hope to capture the effects of
employment barriers on measured discrimination. Certainly, it is not
implausible to argue that employment barriers have a larger impact on
the overall earnings disparities between the sexes than do instances of
unequal pay for equal work.
In Tables 1 and 2 the sum of the numbers in the columns headed by
is an estimate of the differential attributable to discrimination,
In (D+ 1).The sum of the numbers in the columns headed by /3m is
an estimate of the differential attributable to differences in personal
characteristics. These sums and their components are expressed as
percentages of the gross differential in logs.3 As expected, the estimated
effects of discrimination are always larger when calculated from the
regressions that do not control for government, occupation, and industry.
This result is more pronounced in 1960 and for blacks. As can be seen
from Table 1, the estimated effects of sex discrimination among whites
increased from 1960 to 1970 under both decompositions. Furthermore,
the gross logarithmic earnings differential increased by less than the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Iincrease in measured discrimination. This means that an increase in the
relative productivity of white women, as evaluated in terms of the white
male earnings regressions in each year, prevented the gross earnings gap
from widening more than it actually did. Table 2 indicates that discrimi-
nation among blacks diminished over the decade, but by less than the
reduction in the gross earnings differential (in logs). This implies that the
decrease in the gross earnings differential between black men and black
women would not have been as large if it were not for the rise in the
relative productivity of black women. The information in Tables 1 and 2
can be used to estimate annual percentage rates of change in the
male/female earnings ratio, discrimination, and relative productivity.
These calculations have been made and are later presented and compared
with time-series estimates.
An important aspect of labor market discrimination against women
is the impact of government on sex earnings differentials. Our cross-
section analysis sheds some light on the impact of government employ-
ment on male/female relative earnings. It is evident from the decomposi-
tion of the gross earnings differential that government employment
reduces the average earnings of all men relative to the average earnings of
all women in the labor market when compared with the male/female
earnings ratio in the nongovernment sector. This occurs because the
male-female earnings differential is less in government than nongovern-
ment employment and because a larger proportion of female workers
than male workers are employed by government. This narrowing of the
overall earnings differential increased from 1960 to 1970 for both blacks
and whites. The earnings regressions presented in the appendix to this
paper reveal that between 1960 and 1970 the earnings advantage of
government over nongovernment employment declined for all four
race/sex groups. In the case of white men, earnings were actually lower in
government as compared with nongovernment employment; further-
more, this discrepancy widened over the decade. This, of course, does not
contradict the increased importance over the decade of government
employment as a factor tending to narrow the male/female earnings ratio:
the decrease in the earnings advantage of government over nongovern-
ment employment was less for women than for men. These findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that public sector employment is less
discriminatory than employment in the private sector.
Before turning to the time-series results, a few comments are in order
concerning the effects of childbearing on the earnings differential
between men and women workers. Because the common earnings
structure in the absence of discrimination is assumed to be the male
earnings structure, the effects of childbearing must necessarily show up
entirely as a contribution to the estimated effects of differences in
318 Oaxacacoefficients. These effects have been included in our estimates of the
discrimination coefficient.4 One could argue that the wage effects of
childbearing reflect discrimination in terms of access to positions offering
on-the-job training and in terms of forced leave or quitting. An equally
plausible argument against including the effects of childbearing in our
estimates of discrimination is that childbearing reflects voluntary house-
hold decisions regarding the allocation of time between market and
nonmarket work. If we were to accept this argument, then our estimates
of the discrimination coefficient in each year would be lowered; however,
the direction of change in the estimated discrimination coefficients
between 1960 and 1970 would not be affected. In the case of white
women, the increment in measured discrimination would rise because the
effects of children on the sex earnings differential declined between 1960
and 1970. In the case of black women, the reduction in measured
discrimination would be larger because the effects of children on the sex
earnings differential increased over the Census decade.
TimeSeries
Ashas been previously stated, the advantage of the time-series analysis is
that it may shed some light on the effects of cyclical movements on the
male/female earnings ratio. Furthermore, yearly changes in magnitudes
such as the sex earnings ratio and occupational distribution are directly
estimated by time-series regressions. The time-series data are in the
form of published averages and differ somewhat in concept from the
Census microdata. Although some effort has been made to achieve
comparability between the cross-section and time-series data, the
remaining differences should be borne in mind when comparing the
empirical findings.
The time-series earnings data are the median earnings of year-round
full-time workers. The trends in gross differentials in median earnings
were estimated from regressions of the type specified in equation 15.
Variations on this specification were also estimated and the results are
reported in Table 3. It is evident that the gross male-female earnings
differential widened among whites and narrowed among nonwhites over
the period 1955—71. The results also seem to suggest that sex earnings
differentials move countercyclically as evidenced by the positive coeffi-
cients corresponding to the unemployment rate of white males 35—44;
however, these coefficients are never statistically significant at the levels
adopted in this study. Gross differentials widened with increases in the
ratio of female/male unemployment, but this variable is statistically
significant only for nonwhites.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is reasonable to suppose that sufficient time has elapsed since the
passage of the 1963 Federal Equal Pay Act and the passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to detect any significant impact such legislation may have
had on sex differentials in earnings. Are earnings differentials by sex any
smaller than they would have been had there been no such legislation?
Most likely, there would be no immediate impact of such legislation due
to normal lags in the effective implementation of the laws.
To test for differences in the sex earnings ratios in the period following
the federal legislation, a dummy variable representing the period
1966—71 was entered in the reduced-form equations for male-female
earnings differentials. For both whites and nonwhites, the estimated
coefficient was negative but not statistically significant. As an alternative
specification, the dummy variable for the period 1966—7 1 was interacted
with the time-trend variable. The estimated coefficient on the interaction
term was negative for both whites and nonwhites but statistically
significant only for whites; nevertheless, the negative effect was
extremely small, indicating that after 1966 the white male/white female
earnings ratio grew at a rate 0.01 percent per annum less than the
pre-1966 rate. To pursue the possibility that the rate of change of the
male/female earnings ratio was not constant over the perod 1955—71, a
time-squared term was entered in the reduced-form equation.5 Both the
linear and quadratic terms of the time variable are statistically significant
only for whites, and the corresponding coefficients imply that the log of
the white male/white female earnings ratio attained a maximum in 1968
and began declining thereafter. In other words, the growth rate of the
earnings ratio was positive but declining prior to 1968, and was negative
after this period.
In order to estimate the rate of change in the sex earnings ratio
attributable to changes in discrimination, we require independent esti-
mates of changes in relative productivity. These latter estimates were
obtained from equations in which the log of the ratio of male/female labor
quality indexes was regressed on a time trend. In the case of whites, a
quadratic specification of the time variable was also estimated. These
regressions are presented in Table 4. The estimated annual percentage
change in the male/female earnings ratio that can be attributed to changes
in labor market discrimination (d)iscalculated as the difference between
the gross annual percentage change in the earnings ratio andthe
annual percentage change in relative labor quality (th —1).Theestimates
of these parameters are first calculated from the regressions that include
just the linear time-trend variable. These estimates are presented in
Table 5 along with their counterparts derived from the cross-section
results given in Tables 1 and 2. Despite the differences in data sources and
methods, there is a broad consistency between the cross-section and
ThePersistence of Male-Female Earnings Differentials 321TABLE 4Estimated
(1952—71)





































NOTE:Standard errors appearin parentheses.
*Significant at the 0,01 level in a two-tailed teat.
aThe dependent variables are the natural logarithms of the ratio of the male labor quality index to the female
labor quality index. The quality index for a given group in a given year is calculated by summing over the white
male earnings in a given schooling category in 1959 weighted by the proportion of the group who fail in the
particular schooling category in the given year. For white females the indexes 0',.,, and arecalculated using
white male and white female earnings, respectively. The earnings data correspond to individuals who worked 40
or more weeks in 1959 and were obtained from a special tabulation of the 1/1000 sample from the 1960 Census.
These tabulations were kindly made available by Orley Ashenfelter. The schooling categories are as follows: less
than 5 years, 5—8 years, 9—11 years, 12 years, 13—15 years, and 16 years or more. The data corresponding to the
proportion of workers in these categories are reported for 1952, 1959, 1962, and 1964—71. They are available
from the ManpowerReport of the President, March 1973, Table B9, p. 177. Because of discontinuities in the data,
Durbin-Watson statistics are not reported.
time-series results. Both show an annual percentage increase in the
male/female earnings ratio among whites and a decrease among non-
whites. The estimated rate varies from 0.3 percent to 0.5percenta year
for whites and from —2.0 percent to —2.1 percent a year for nonwhites.
Large differences in estimates occur with respect to dandth —f. Thisis to
be expected in view of the crude nature of the labor quality index
calculated from the time-Series data available. Educational distribution
alone is an extremely narrow basis on which to gauge changes in relative
labor quality. In this regard, the Census microdata are clearly superior,
because they provide detailed information on several different compo-
nents of overall labor quality. Because the educational distribution of
male workers has been improving over the years vis-à-vis female work-
ers, it is not surprising that the time-series construction shows a rise in
male relative to female labor quality. The tendency is to bias downward
the estimated rate of change in the sex earnings ratio attributable to
discrimination. In spite of this, discrimination is estimated to have
increased among whites and to have fallen among nonwhites.6 The
cross-section estimates reveal a decrease in male/female relative labor
322 Oaxaca
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°g =[ln(G+ (G+ l)seJ/10.
bd =fin (L5+ 1}70—in(L5+ 1)gjjj/10
and
where
In +[ln (0+1)—In (O+1)J/2
'C
Thesecalculations are based on the cross-section Census earnings regressions that control for government,
occupation, and industry.
Cdandm—farederived as in footnote b except that the underlying regressions do not control for government,
occupation, and industry.
dg=a In [0 +11/arestimated from the time-series male/female relative earnings regressions in which tentersin
linear form.
Cd=g —(rn—f); wherern—f= a In estimatedfrom the time-series relative labor quality regressions
which used male earnings as weights and in which time enters in linear form.
'dandm—farederived as in footnote e except that the underlying relative labor quality regressions used white
female earnings as weights.
qualityfor both whites and nonwhites. They also reveal an increase in
discrimination among whites larger than the time-series estimates, and
they show a decrease in discrimination among nonwhites smaller than the
time-series estimates.7
Returning to the question of the impact of legislation on the
male/female earnings ratio, we note that the quadratic specification of the
time variable in the relative earnings and relative labor quality equations
permit the treatment ofand dasfunctions of time. Let
g(t)=a = a, + 2a2t
m(t)—f(t)=ô in [Qm/QpI/8t = b5+2b5t'
d(t)= g(r) — [m (t) —f(r)] = ab5 + 2(a2t — b2r')
wherea1, b1, a1 —b1>0and a2, b2, a2 —b2<0.Since the relative
earnings regressions are estimated over the period 1955—71 and the
relative labor quality regressions extend over the period 1952—71, we
havetherelationshipi"=t+ 3.Substitutingfort'wehave
d(t) = a1 —b1—6b2+2(a2—b2)t.To calculate the year in which the sex
ThePersistence ofMale-FemaleEarnings Differentials 323earnings ratio attains a maximum as a result of discrimination, set d(t)
equal to zero and solve fort:t = (ai—b1—6b2)/2(b2—a2). These
computations were performed forwhites. Using thetranslation
T= 1954 +t, theresults suggest that discrimination began to diminish in
The evidence seems to suggest a small but discernible reversal in the
trend toward increasesinthe white-male—white-female earnings
differential at about the same time we would have expected government
policy to start taking effect. The problems with interpreting these results
as indicative of the effects of government policy are formally the same as
those problems encountered in the Phillips curve literature on the
effectiveness of wage-price guideposts. We may only be observing the net 0
effect of many factors which are not otherwise accounted for by the
regression in the particular period under study. Yet as slim as the
evidence is that government policy was responsible for damping or
reversing the growth in the sex earnings differential for whites, the results g
dopoint to a small reduction in discrimination for whatever reasons. g
Turningnow to male-female occupational changes over time, Table 6 0
presentsthe estimated effects of trend and cyclical factors on male-female .E
differencesinoccupationaldistributionforeightoccupational
categories.9 First examining the results for whites, we find that statisti-
cally significant trends in male-female differences in occupational con-
centration occurred in favor of men in the following occupations:
professional & technical, and managerial, officials, and proprietors. On
the other hand, statistically significant trends in white male-female
differences in occupational concentration occurred in favor of greater (I)
relativefemale concentration in the following occupations: clerical &
sales, and farming. Cyclical factors exerted no statistically significant
independent influence on male-female differences in occupational con-
centration except for the laborers category. In this occupation, loose
labor markets lead to increases in male concentration over female
concentration. In the case of nonwhites, we find statistically significant
trends in the concentration of male employment over the concentration
of female employment among the following occupations: managerial,
officials, & proprietors; craftsmen; and service & private household
workers. Statistically significant trends in nonwhite male-female occupa-
tional concentration differences indicate a trend toward greater relative
representation of nonwhite females among clerical & sales workers and
laborers. In periods of loose labor markets, male concentration increases
over female concentration among professional and technical workers and
decreases among craftsmen. The estimated coefficients of the unemploy-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.As has been discussed earlier, we can directly measure overall occupa-
tional similarity/dissimilarity through the use of a single index. The
regressions relating this index to the time trend and cyclical variables
are reported in Table 7. As the results show, there was no movement in
TABLE7Estimated Equations for Occupational Dissimilarity
(1958—71)
























at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed test.
aTheindexof occupational standing is calculated as one-half the sum of the absolute values of the difference
between the percentages of males and females in each occupation. For the source of the occupational data used
in the construction of the index refer to footnote a in Table 6.
bRefer to footnote b in Table 3.
the index for either whites or nonwhites over the period 1958—71. Since
broad occupational categories were used, these findings do not rule out
the possibility of changes in occupational dissimilarity occurring among
more disaggregated classifications. The CEA index based on more
disaggregated data was calculated as 62.9 in 1960 and 59.8in1970 for
whites and nonwhites combined [CEA 1973]. This slight movement
toward occupational similarity represents a reduction of 3.1 percentage
points over a ten-year period, or an average reduction of only 0.3
percentage points a year. Thus, the use of more detailed data does not
alter the conclusion that little progress has been made in the area of sex
differences in occupational distribution.
It has been shown earlier that the effects of changes in occupational
distributions on the overall male-female earnings differential depend on
the earnings differentials within occupations. Unfortunately, yearly
occupational earnings data are not available for each race/sex group
separately. Such data are, however, available in Census years. Conse-
quently, the data from our urban worker subsamples are used to calculate
occupational effects on changes in relative earnings in accordance with













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































within the clerical & sales occupation tended to substantially narrow the
overall sex earnings differential for whites, while the managerial and
craftsmen occupations contributed substantially to a widening of the
differential. In the case of nonwhites, the clerical & sales and laborer
occupations contributed significantly to a narrowing of the differential.
The managerial, craftsmen, and services & private household occupa-
tions contributed to a substantial widening of the earnings gap among
nonwhites. Because of the hybrid nature of these estimates, their sums do
not exactly equal either the cross-section or time-series annual rate of
growth in the male/female earnings ratio.
III.CONCLUDING REMARKS
Fromthe middle of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s the
male-female earnings differential for year-round workers increased
among whites and decreased among blacks. Both the cross-section and
time-series analyses point to an increase in sex discrimination among
whites and a reduction in sex discrimination among blacks as the factors
responsible for the trends observed in their respective gross earnings
differentials. During this period there occurred little or no movement
toward occupational similarity between men and women in either racial
group.
Government has been shown to have some narrowing effect on
earnings differentials. Government employment has had the effect of
reducing the economy-wide male-female earnings differential below the
private sector differential. That is to say, the male-female earnings
differential would be larger in the absence of public-sector employment.
There is also some suggestion that legislation may also have had an effect
on the sex earnings differential. This is especially true for whites. Over the
entire period of 1955 through 1971 there was, on the average, an increase
in the earnings differential due to discrimination; however, the rate of
increase was not constant. Starting around 1966, the adjusted growth rate
of the male-female earnings differential among whites diminished or
perhaps even became negative due to reductions in discrimination.
Government policy stemming from the 1963 Federal Equal Pay Act and
the 1964 Civil Rights Act may have been responsible for the downturn in
the steady growth in the earnings differential due to discrimination.
Although the adjusted white-male/white-female earnings ratios were
smaller after 1966 than what would have been predicted on the basis of
pre-1966 relationships, the effects were fairly small.
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IWe have seen that sex earnings differentials rise during periods of loose
labor markets and fall during periods of tight labor markets. This
supports the expectation that efforts toward greater equal employment
opportunity will enjoy more success during periods of relative prosperity.
At such times, there is a maximum of flexibility for making needed
changes in employment practices where women and minorities are
concerned. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the unemployment
rate of white males aged 35—44 averaged 1.9 percent over the period
1966—71 as compared with 3.0 percent over the period 1955—65. Any
efforts toward promoting equal employment opportunities during
1966—7 1 surely benefited from coincidence with full employment.
There are certain nagging problems with the residual approach to
measuring discrimination. Space limitations permit only brief mention of
these problems, but they do merit careful attention by students of the
economics of discrimination. We have assumed that a common earnings
structure would exist in the absence of discrimination. It can be argued,
however, that specialization within households could lead to different
earnings structures for men and women even in the absence of discrimi-
nation. This has implications for sex differences in the acquisition of
on-the-job training and occupational choice. It is extremely difficult to
give any precise information about the allocation of time within house-
holds that would exist if there were no sex discrimination in the market
sector.
Clearly, the legislative intent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was to go
beyond the narrow definition of discrimination inherent in the 1963
Equal Pay Act, which prohibited unequal pay for equal work. It is
debatable whether the wider view of discrimination is adequately
reflected by earnings regressions that control for broad occupational
categories. One could argue that adjusted earnings differentials within
broad occupational groupings mainly reflect discriminatory employment
practices, whereas, sex differences in broad occupational affiliation
mainly reflect voluntary labor supply decisions explainable in terms of a
household life-cycle maximization model. It is the author's contention
that the traditional occupational choices of women have been in large
part conditioned by the rational expectation of labor market discrimina-
tion. Therefore, the estimates of discrimination obtained from the
inclusion and exclusion of occupation, industry, and government employ-
ment are best viewed for policy purposes as lower and upper bounds to
measured discrimination.
Although the residual approach to measuring discrimination avoids the
difficult questions regarding the interactions of social and political
institutions in determining sex roles, the approach does possess a certain
operational practicality. The objective is to arrive at a set of regression
ThePersistence of Male-Female Earnings Differentials 329control variables that reasonably reflect legislative intent with regard to
implied definitions of unlawful discrimination. The residual approach
allows us to measure discrimination in accordance with legislative intent
and to gauge progress in terms of this standard. It is obvious that there has
been a growing impatience over the race and sex earnings differentials
that have long persisted in our society. While there is a genuine scholarly
interest in researching the formation of these roles, public policy toward
discrimination has not awaited, and should not await, the definitive
treatment of the subect.
APPENDIX
Backgroundregressions which are used in the construction of Tables 1, 2,
and 8 in the main text are reported in this appendix. The cross-section
earnings regressions are reported in Tables A-i and A-2, and the
estimated equations for changes in occupational distribution are given in
Table A-3.
A brief explanation will be given of the procedures used in connection
with the cross-section earnings regressions. As is stated in the text, the
cross-section data are drawn from the 1960 and 1970 Census 1/1000
Public Use Samples. In 1960, there was only one type of Public Use
Sample available, but in 1970 there were six subcategories to choose
from. For this study, the 1970 Neighborhood Characteristics 15 percent
sample was used. Our data refer to those who worked 50—5 2 weeks in the
year prior to the year in which the Census was conducted, who also
resided inside urban areas, and who also were either government or
private wage and salary workers.
Those familiar with Census data know that the Bureau of the Census
establishes cutoff levels beyond which household and individual incomes
are not reported. The cutoffs and their associated open intervals were
$25,000 in 1960 and $50,000 in 1970. The problem confronting the
researcher is what income should be assigned to individuals whose
incomes are reported to lie somewhere in these open-ended intervals. A
commonly accepted practice, and one which is followed in this study, is to
estimate the upper tail of the income distribution as a Pareto distribution.
From the Pareto distribution we can estimate the mean income of the
above $25,000 or $50,000 class.
Assume that the Pareto density function describes the distribution of








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The cumulative distribution is given by
N(y)__J
where N( y) is the proportion of workers earning incomes less than or
equal to y. Let G(y) be the proportion of workers earning incomes
greater than y, then
G(y)1—N(y)=
or in terms of logs,
lnG(y)=aln(Y0)—aln(y)
Let G(Y1) and G(Y2) be the proportion of workers earning incomes
greater than Y1 and 1'2, respectively. By substituting these pairs of values
into the equation for ln G(y) and solving for a, we obtain
=—In[G(Y1)/G(Y2)]/ln Y2)
We have for 1960 Y1 =$15,000and Y2 =$25,000,but for 1970 Y1 =
$35,000and Y2 =$50,000.
The average income of those earning above Y2( Vh) is calculated as the
conditional mean of y for yY2:
a—i
where Y2$25,000 and $50,000 for 1960 and 1970, respectively.
Values of Yfi were estimated in each year for the combined sample of all
four race/sex groups. Each worker whose income was reported in the
open-ended interval was assigned an income of Yh. For the independent
variables, these workers were assigned the mean values corresponding to
the members of their particular race/sex group whose incomes were in
the open-ended interval.
The independent variables used in the earnings regressions are briefly
definedhere.EXP =potentialexperiencecalculatedasage —
education—6 years. EDUC =yearsof schooling completed. NEAST,
NCENT, and WEST are regional dummy variables representing the
Northeast, Northcentral, and West, respectively. The South is the
regional reference group. U499, UR499, and UR500 are urban city size
dummy variables representing residence in a central city located in an
urban area of 50,000—499,999, residence in the remainder of an urban
area 50,000—499,999, and residence in the remainder of an urban area
of 500,000 or greater. Residence in a central city located in an urban area
of 500,000 or greater is the city size reference group. SINGLE, DS, and
ThePersistence of Male-Female Earnings Differentials 341I
WID aremarital status dummy variables representing never married,
divorced or separated, and widowed. Married workers form the marital
status reference group. CHILD =thenumber of children born to the
female worker. PARTIME is a dummy variable which identifies individu-
als who worked less than thirty-five hours during the week prior to the
Census week. MOVE is a dummy variable which identifies individuals
who have changed county, state, or national residence since the age of
eighteen during the previous five years. GOVT is a dummy variable
which identifies government workers. The occupational dummy variables
are defined as follows: PROF =professional,technical, and kindred
workers; MANAGE =managersand administrators, except farm;
CLERclericaland kindred workers; CRAFT =craftsmenand
kindred workers; OPER =operatives(including transport equipment
operatives); PRIV =privatehousehold workers; SERV =servicework-
ers; LABOR =laborers,except farm; FARM =farmers,farm mana-
gers, farm laborers, and farm foremen; and NOCC =nooccupation
reported. Sales workers form the occupational reference group. The
industry dummy variables are as follows: AG =agriculture,forestry,
forestry,andfisheries;MINE =mining;CON =construction;
DURMAN =manufacturing,durablegoods;NONDUR =manu- F
facturing, nondurable goods; TRANS =transportation,communica-
tions, and utilities and sanitary services; WTRADE =wholesaletrade;
FINANCE =finance,insurance, and real estate; BUSREP =business
and repair services; PERSER =personalservices; REC =entertainment
and recreation services; PROFSER =professionaland related services;
PUBADM =publicadministration;andNOIND =industrynot
reported. Retail trade workers form the industry reference group.
NOTES
1.Computer delays and difficulties precluded carrying out these tests. For additional
information on these testing procedures see [Oaxaca 1974].
2.The earnings data from the 1960 and 1970 censuses correspond to 1959 and 1969,
respectively.
3.Because of rounding-off errors, these mutually exhaustive decompositions do not, in
general, add up to the exact value of the gross differential in logs.
4.Had we instead assumed the female earnings structure to be the common earnings
structure, the effects of childbearing would have shown up entirely as the effects of
differences in the mean values of the independent variables, e.g., as a source of earnings
differentials attributable to worker productivity differences.
5.This specification was suggested to the author by Andrea Belier.





* Significantat the0.05levelinatwo-tailed test.
tSignificantat the 0.01levelin a two-tailed test.
7.To handle the discrepancies from rounding-off errors in the cross-section decomposi-
tions, the difference between the actual and calculated gross differentials in logs was
apportioned equally between the measures of discrimination and productivity
differences reported in Tables 1 and 2.
8.The results also predict that the male/female labor quality ratio for whites should peak
in 1974.
9.The separate occupational regressions are reported by race and sex in Table A-3 of the
appendix.
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Ronald Oaxaca has applied a previously developed methodology to analyze
trends in male-female earnings differentialsin the period 1955_71.1 The
approach is an attempt to sort out the effect of discrimination from other factors
that might account for the earnings gap and to test hypotheses about changes in
sex discrimination since 1955.
Oaxaca concludes from his analysis that for white year-round, full-time
workers, the male-female differential in median earnings (adjusted for hours
worked) increased by 15 percent from 1955 to 1971 with about 55 percent of this
attributable to increased discrimination and the rest due to the relative increase
in an index of male to female labor quality. He found a small rate of decline in the
rate of increase in discrimination after 1965 which he suggests may be related to
more favorable government policies toward women reflected in the 1963
Federal Equal Pay Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
For nonwhite year-round, full-time workers, Oaxaca found a significant
decline in the male-female earnings differential, from 73 percent in 1955 to 33
percent in 1971 and concludes that practically all of this gain for black women
represented a decline in sex discrimination. He makes the interesting, and I
believe accurate, suggestion that this decline in the black sex differential not
attributable to differences in labor quality was more likely due to black women
gaining access to jobs formerly held by white women than their penetration of
male occupations. If this is true, it is, of course, inappropriate to refer to the effect
Comments by Barrett
4as a decline in sex discrimination per se, but instead it should be attributed to
differential rates of change of racial discriminatiàn by sex.
Oaxaca found very little change in male-female occupational structure over
the period. Employment of women relative to men increased most rapidly in the
sales and clerical fields that were already traditionally dominated by women,
supporting the view that the relative deterioration of female wages during a
period of rapid influx into the labor force is due to crowding into occupations
where their wages are low because of their exclusion from other kinds of work.2
White females lost representation relative to white males in the Professional and
Technical, Managerial, and Officials and Proprietors categories, suggesting that
efforts to penetrate higher status occupations have not been successful. Oaxaca
also found that the sex earnings gap falls in tight labor markets, suggesting that
prosperity promotes equality and recession fosters discrimination.
The tone of Oaxaca's conclusions is hedgingly optimistic. We still have sex
discrimination, particularly among whites, but its rate of increase is on the
decline. And black women are faring much better relative to black men, albeit at
the expense of white women. And if we can regain prosperity and full
employment we can expect even more success.
Oaxaca's paper addresses an extremely important issue, particularly in view
of an explicitly stated governmental policy to reduce discrimination in the United
States. Unfortunately, I cannot concur with the author's optimistic interpretation
of the trends.
My objections are concerned with both his methodology and interpretation. I
have always been uneasy about studies that treat discrimination as an un-
explained residual, since we have available a number of hypotheses about the
way discrimination is transmitted that are certainly susceptible to empirical
testing. But if we can ignore that issue—and let me say parenthetically that I
think it is extremely dangerous to let this research be disseminated outside of
econometric conferences with the label "discrimination" applied to the unex-
plained residual—we must, at least, be sure that we have accounted for all the
factors that might have been responsible for changes in the sex earning gap
before we draw conclusions about trends in discrimination. This isn't to say
everything must be included—but the important things must be.
To use an index of years of schooling as a measure of labor quality and then to
use this index as the sole source of nondiscriminatory wage change (other than
hours worked) may be permissible for a study of black-white earnings differen-
tials, a a Ashenfelter,3 but its extension to an analysis of sex discrimination is
not warranted. Oaxaca observes that a major difference between race and sex
factors is that female labor force participation has increased sharply relative to
that of men, whereas this has not been the case for blacks relative to whites.
What Oaxaca does not observe is that the age composition of the female labor
force has also undergone a radical change over the period, particularly for white
women, with an important shift occu ring around 1965 that increased the relative
participation of women under 25. We are all aware that the age profiles of
male-female earnings, particularly for whites, are not very far apart until around
age 25 and then widen rapidly until age 55 when they begin to close again. There
are a number of reasons for this, involving barriers to the acquisition of human
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issues here. The point is that these discrepancies in the age-profiles of the
male-female earnings rates, together with a shift in the age composition of new
labor force entrants around 1965, can more than account for the so-called
decline in the rate of increase in discrimination Oaxaca observes when his data
are not adjusted for age.
Table 1 shows the percent change in labor force participation rates for white
women over the period 1955—71, and for the subperiods 1955—65 and 1966—71
TABLE IPercentage Change in Labor Force Participation




1955—71 23.521.7 5.826.4 32.925.8 25.8 33.6—11.4
1955-65 10.4 —4.0 —2.7 7.4 10.7 11.0 16.9 26.7 —7.6
1966—71 11.826.8 8.7 17.7 20.1 13.3 7.6 5.5 —4.1
Female/male
earnings ratio
(1966) .57 .87 .87 .68 .55 .48 .50 .55 .62
SOURCE:Labor Force Participation Rates: U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Report of the President,
1973. Earnings Ratio: Isabel V. Sawhill. 'The Economics of Discrimination Against Women: Some
New Findings," Journal of Human Resources 8 (Summer 1973), pp.383—395. Estimated from the
Current Population Survey, 1966.
In the earlier period, the growth inparticipation for young women was
considerably below the average for all women, with the highest rates of entry
coming in the age group with the largest male-female earnings gap. Since
1966—71 the rate of entry is much higher for young women, who experience
much less discrimination with respect to earnings. However, and this is
extremely important, just because these young women have higher earnings
relative to men than older women, there is no evidence that they will not face
exactly the same sort of wage discrimination for the same reasons when they
get older. Hall and others have suggested that older black workers as a group
have relatively low earnings because of a "vintage effect," that is, they have less
education than younger workers.4 This implies that the improved earnings
position of younger black workers represents a real gain due to a decline in
discrimination in educational opportunity. But educational opportunities have not
changed significantly for women over the period and lower wages for older
women undoubtedly reflect their inability or unwillingness to acquire human
capital or to attain managerial status that would increase their earnings profile as
they age. This means that an increase in overall female earnings as a result of a
reduction in the average age of the female work force does not imply that
discrimination has declined or that any individual woman has a higher expected
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lifetime earnings stream than before, even though a different interpretation
could be made for blacks.It may well be that consciousness-raising has
produced an incentive for younger women to penetrate male occupations, but
there is not evidence of this and Oaxaca's occupational results do not suggest
such a trend.
In Table 2,I show some crude estimates of the impact of changes in the age
structure of the female laborforcethatwould have occurred if there had been no
change in the male-female earnings ratio by age. ERis the female-male earnings
ratio by age for full-time workers computed from the Current Population Survey
in 1966 and adjusted for hours worked. Over the entire 1955—71 period, for
white females, changes in their age distribution alone should have increasedthe
overall ER by .61 percent per year. In the earlier period, 1955—65, the potential
annual rate of increase was .41 percent, while in 1966—71 it was 1 .2 percent!
Now these estimates are admittedly crude and the use of 1966 earnings data
was arbitrary. However, Fuchs has shown that there is not much difference in
the age profiles of the sex earnings ratios between 1960 and On the other
hand, there is likely to be some interaction in the labor quality index that would
reduce the absolute marginal impact of the age effect.
Apart from the implications for the absolute changes in sex discrimination
(that now will increase by the amount of the potential increase in ER associated
with changing age composition) what is most interesting is the huge difference
in this effect before and after 1965. Not only has the rate of increase in the wage
gap attributable to discrimination increased by about .6 percent more per year
overall than Oaxaca estimates (less any interaction with the labor quality index),
but the rate of increase in discrimination would increase substantially (by .8
percent per year) after 1965 rather than decrease. Not only is all the slowdown
Oaxaca observes explained by the changing age distribution of the female labor
force, but it is more than accounted for and by a large margin, indicating an
increase rather than decline in the rate of increase of discrimination. The influx of
young men into the labor force since the deescalation in Vietnam has undoutedly
worked in the same direction, but I have not tried to estimate that effect.
Table 3 shows similar computations for black females. Changing age distribu-
tion had very little effect on their earnings relative to black males, except after
1965 when a changing age composition had the potential effect of increasing the
female-male earnings ratio by .9 percent per year. This implies that after 1965,
Oaxaca overstated the amount of reduction in sex discrimination (if one can
properly call it that) in the black labor force.
Not only does Oaxaca fail to correct for age, but the assumptions he makes
about his labor quality index may also bias his results. For instance, in order to
obtain the result that the rate of discrimination declined after 1965 he had to
assume that the male and female labor quality indexes grew at a constant rate.
Since his entire paper was concerned with trend analysis, I am puzzled that he
did not test for a nonlinear trend in the labor quality indexes also. Since there is,
for all practical purposes, a finite limit to the amount of formal education one
receives (statistically itis the 16+ category), then labor quality cannot grow
indefinitely, More than likely, the relative educational gains of white males is a
once and for all phenomenon. Furthermore, as Oaxaca observes, if labor quality
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TABLE 2Estimated Effect of Changing Age Composition of












ER (2) x (3)
(Group,) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1955—71(Average Annual Rate of Change 0.61 Percent)
16+ 10,103 1.00 1.00
16—17 634 0.063 1.534 .097
18—19 783 0.078 1.534 .120
20—24 2,285 0.226 1.199 .271
25—34 1,422 0,141 0.970 .137
35—44 952 0.094 0.846 .080
45—54 2.160 0.214 0.881 .189
55—64 1,631 0.161 0.970 .156
65+ 236 0.023 1.093 .025
1=1.073
1955—65(Average Annual Rate of Change 0.41 Percent)
16+ 4,870 1.00 1.00
16—17 286 0.059 1.534 .091
18—19 439 0.090 .138
20—24 773 0.159 1.199 .191
25—34 22 0.005 0.970 .005
35—44 745 0.153 0.846 .129
45—54 1,378 0.283 0.881 .249
55—64 1,046 0.215 0.970 .209
65+ 159 0.033 1.093 .036
1=1.047
1966—71(Average Annual Rate of Change 1.2 Percent)
16+ 4,287 1.00 1.00
16—17 266 0.062 1.534 .095
18—19 119 0.028 1.534 .043
20—24 1,299 0.303 1.199 .363
25—34 1,236 0.288 0.970 .279
35—44 189 0.044 0.846 .037
45—54 633 0.148 0.881 .130
55—64 454 0.106 0.970 .103
65+ 91 0.021 1.093 .023
I = 1.074
SOURCE:See Table 1.
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Change in Relative to
Labor ForceOverall Change
of Age Group in Labor ER
Age (Thousands) Force ER (2) x (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1955—71(Average Annual Rate of Change 0.15 Percent)
16+ 1439 1.00 1.00
16—17 57 0.040 1.29 .052
18—19 95 0.066 1.25 .083
20—24 342 0.238 1.12 .267
25—34 259 0.180 1.02 .184
35—44 198 0.138 0.917 .127
45—54 256 0.178 0.899 .160
55—64 194 0.135 0.951 .128
65+ 41 0.028 1.07 .030
£= 1.029
1955—65(Average Annual Rate of Change 0.0 Percent)
16+ 801 1.00 1,00
16—17 27 0.034 1.29 .044
18—19 37 0.046 1.25 .057
20—24 147 0.184 1.12 .206
25—34 55 0.069 1.02 .070
35—44 171 0.213 0.917 .195
45—54 181 0.226 0.899 .203
55—64 148 0.185 0.951 .176
65+ 36 0.045 1.07 .048
1.000
1966—71(Average Annual Rate of Change 0.9 Percent)
16+ 505 1.00 1.00
16—17 12 0.024 1,29 .031
18—19 24 0.048 1.25 .060
20—24 183 0.362 1.12 .405
25—34 188 0.372 1.02 .379
35—44 8 0.016 0.917 .015
45—54 53 0.105 0.899 .094
55—64 35 0.069 0.951 .066
65+ 2 0.004 1.07 .004
I = 1.055
SOURCE:See Tab'e 1.
The Persistence of MaIe-Fem&e Earnings Differentialsis related to experience as well as to education, then the growing attachment of
females to the labor force ought to raise relative female labor quality. If these
factors were taken into account, male labor quality relative to female labor quality
would not have increased at a constant rate over the period and the earnings gap
attributable to discrimination would have been greater. Furthermore, if the rate
of relative gains of men slowed later in the period, then the decline in the rate of
growth of discrimination cited by Oaxaca would not have been observed.
In general, Ifindit very difficult to be optimistic about trends in sex
discrimination when so little progress seems to be made in reducing occupa-
tional segregation by sex. We all know that instances of unequal pay for equal
work are rare and that the Equal PayAct of 1963 merely ratified existing practice.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was more specifically addressed to the issue of
occupational discrimination, but the evidence is that women are losing rather
than gaining representation in high status occupations.
There are other problems. The paper fails to address the consequences of
inability of many women to get full-time work. The interpretation of the cyclical
results also has to be viewed with caution. My own work, for instance, has
shown female unemployment to rise relative to men's in tight labor markets,6
suggesting that prosperity does not unequivocally improve the labor force status
of women.
Most of my remarks have been addressed to sex differentials among whites,
in part because discrimination on the basis of sex seems to be more of a problem
and a growing problem within that group. However, while I have less quarrel
with the data for sex differences between blacks, I have difficulty accepting the
interpretation that sex discrimination per se is any less present. Black women
are not penetrating male occupations; racial discrimination is simply less severe
among women. Undoubtedly this is because no women—black or white—gain
much from seniority. Hierarchical relationships in female employment are less
prevalent and black women and white women are systematically excluded
(voluntarily or involuntarily) from acquiring human capital and attaining manager-
ial positions. To the extent that black women drop out of the labor force less
frequently than white women, they may even have an advantage. It is disturbing
indeed if this equalization among women is cited as a triumph for racial equality
and as a sign of lessening of racial discrimination. There are simply fewer
channels through which racial discrimination can be transmitted among females
than among males. And my own personal opinion is that women workers have
less of a Beckerian taste for discrimination7 in general, in part because they feel
less threatened by the encroachment of racial minorities on their jobs or pay
standards.
Despite these reservations about the interpretation of the experience of the
1960s, for a number of reasons I, personally, see some grounds for optimism
about the future relative income position of women. First and foremost are the
social changes and the growing awareness of young women that sex roles
based on outdated needs and institutions need not limit their labor force
experience to being a nurse, secretary, domestic worker, saleslady, or elemen-
tary school teacher, I think young women are growing increasingly to expect a
more or less continuous labor force commitment and that the men they live with
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jwill, in turn, see that these trends are to their advantage as well. Most of the
evidence that I have seen suggests that if progress is being made along these
linesitis at a snail's pace. The ideology of the women's movement has
developed much faster than its practical implications. But to evaluate these
prospects in a rigorous and scientific way, as opposed to an impressionistic one,
one needs an underlying theoretical rationale for discrimination on which to base
a structural model. For instance, one approach suggests that women as a group
will only attain equality with men if they penetrate male occupations at an early
age, stay in the Jabor force, and acquire human capital and assume managerial
responsibilities conducive to substantial growth of their wages over the life
cycle. In other words, occupational choices of young women may be the key to
forecasting the future age-earnings profile of all female workers. The empirical
analogue to this model would be to examine changes in the sex composition of
the various occupational categories by age group to determine whether or not
the observed tendency of the female-dominated occupations to absorb most of
the increases in the female labor force is due to the choices of young women or
instead to those of older women whose career horizons may be more limited.
The implications for the future course of male-female wage differentials may be
much more interesting than any simple extrapolation in the trend of some
unexplained residual—labeled "discrimination" only for want of a better word,
and perhaps to elicit some emotional reaction. Such pure empiricism can only
run up against some of the problems I have described. Again, I applaud the effort
to measure discrimination and to ascertain whether or not it is waning. But to
design effective social policy to eliminate discrimination, one must develop a
theoretical explanation, not just a chart of its course.
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Oaxaca's paper represents an enormously innovative and up-to-date measure-
ment of the discrimination component in the earnings differential between
women and men. He also provides a useful framework for tracking its changing
behavior over time.
Oaxaca adapts a discrimination model measuring the adjusted growth rate of
male-female earnings differences, with a cyclical measure of labor market
tightness, and time as the main arguments accounting for changes in the
behavior differential. The gross earnings differential provides a residual which,
when adjusted by an index employed to account for male-female labor quality
differences, purports to "explain" the amount of the widening pay differential
between men and women over the 1957—71 period attributable to discrimina-
tion.
The same determinants, i.e., a cyclical component and time trend, are also
arguments in the differential changes in male-female occupational distribution
over time and in measuring the effects of changes in occupational distribution on
the gross male-female earnings differential.
Oaxaca finds that the gross male-female earnings differential rose 15 percen-
tage points, from 55 percent in 1955 to 70 percent by 1971, and his results
estimate that more than one-half of the differential was due to sex discrimina-
tion, with the discrimination component on the increase up to 1966. He finds that
a reduction in discrimination from 1966 onward probably operated to check
further widening in the earnings gap after 1968.
He estimates that part of the slowdown in the widening pay gap may have
been caused by the lagged impact of federal equal pay legislation (1963), and the
1964 Civil Rights Act, but notes that the legislation's enforcement machinery
operated concurrently with other factors (e.g., labor market tightness and the
military draft) which were probably far more significant.
At any rate, Oaxaca's own results suggest that Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commision and equal pay enforcement effects were minimal in this respect.
On the whole, Oaxaca's findings are impressive. His estimate (of over 50
percent) certainly exceeds a different one recently made for the Council of
Economic Advisers, which claimed that only about 20 percent of the pay
difference between men and women was due to sex bias.
This is the more remarkable since Oaxaca's index of relative labor productivity
is constructed in a manner thatfails to account adequatelyfor recent shifts in the
labor market behavior of women in terms of their labor force participation and
attachment, and in the rising proportion of the total U.S. labor force comprised of
women (from 30 percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 1973).
Now, during this period males gained on females in terms of school years
completed, but male labor force participation and the proportion of men in the
labor force have declined since 1960, whereas, for females, dramatic rises
occurred in both these statistics. Oaxaca's index therefore overstates the
importance of male labor productivity changes relative to females and corres-
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pondingly probably underestimates the amount of the male-female pay differen-
tial properly ascribable to discrimination.
This point concerning the rising importance of female labor in the U.S.
economy deserves further elaboration, since it has crucial implications for the
future of female job segregation and unemployment. Neoclassical theories
regarding womens "weak" attachment to the labor market are founded on
nothing much stronger than outmoded sexist notions of women's "proper"
social role. They satisfy what Gaibraith terms a "convenient social virtue" of
facilitating growing household consumption. Whether or not one can accept this
view, it is significant that almost every projection made in recent years regarding
labor force growth has been consistently understated, usually by the amount of
the substantial underestimate in the growth of the female labor force.
Now, given the growing segregation of women in jobs predominantly
"female," such as elementary and secondary school teacher and clerical worker,
combined with the inflationary surge certain to "push" more women out of the
home and into the labor market, unless male labor force participation declines
more drastically, relative unemployment for women can be expected to move
sharply upward in the coming years. This may lead to further widening in the
amount of the male-female differential due to discrimination, because the
additional women entrants must be absorbed in jobs more restrictive in terms of
sex bias and must try to get hired by employers with higher than average
"discrimination coefficients." One possible counter to forestall this outcome
would be a more determined federal enforcement against, and monitoring of,
sexist labor market practices.
A final point, Oaxaca offers two alternative interpretations of the reduction in
the nonwhite male-female earnings differential—a marked contrast to the white
relationship. One is greater relative reduction in sex discrimination against
nonwhite females relative to a reduction in racial discrimination against non-
white males. The other interpretation, which he feels to be the more likely, and
which I would like to underscore, is that while nonwhite females have not really
invaded traditionally nonwhite male jobs, they have probably been relatively
more successful in "nailing down" a larger share of traditional white female jobs
(e.g., clerical and health workers).
Moreover, given the unaccountable decline in the black male labor force
participation, the stronger labor force attachment of black women relative to
white women, and finally the persistence of black male segregation in jobs such
as nonfarm laborers and operatives—employment highly sensitive to the
level of aggregate activity—it is hardly surprising that the diminution of the
male-female pay differential has been more marked among nonwhites.
Oaxaca mentions the sort of "chicken or egg" dispute among economists as
to the extent to which differing sex occupational distributions are due to job
market bias, and the extent to which they may be ascribed to differing job
preferences between men and women. He points to some "promising"
research conducted by psychologists testing whether there are "real" differ-
ences by sex as to motivations, aspirations, and expectations regarding career
fulfillment. I, for one, am not too hopeful that any illuminating result will emerge
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from such findings. Labor market sex bias operates, on the one hand, directly to
constrict female job opportunities, while generating, on the other hand, intricate
feedback which conditions female job and career aspirations, expectations, and
motivations from adolescence to old age.I know of no generally acceptable
econometric technique which could adequately model these joint tendencies.
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